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I.

ARGUMENT

The important circumstances in this case devolve from negotiations surrounding the
Right-of-Way Contract (“ROW Contract”) that was signed on October 23, 1967, between the
State and the Day family. The State over-relies on the State’s view of the statements made
during negotiations leading up to that agreement in its Statement of the Facts and which are at
odds with that agreement or the Warranty Deed prepared by the State and signed by the Days the
same day. Cited are the notes of the State and the appraisals preceding the 1967 ROW Contract
to support the State’s view that the Property would be left without a road. (See R., p. 461, 47778, 491-93.) Regardless of the views expressed by the State’s appraisers or attributed to the
Days by the State prior to the ROW Contract, the Day family eventually negotiated for
something better than the dreary prospects expressed by the State’s witnesses in the run-up to the
ROW Contract. The ROW Contract and following Warranty Deed provided the Days with more
than the earlier limited, if not bleak access; the Property was promised a Future Frontage Road
and included a corresponding map appended to that ROW Contract that detailed its location. (R.,
pp. 42-45.) The State’s limited view of those negotiations illustrate perfectly the ultimate issues
before this Court—whether the district court properly considered the entire record before it when
it dismissed the Appellants’ claims.
At issue in this appeal is the district court’s decision on the State’s motion to dismiss.
For Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the court’s review is limited to the pleadings, and all
inferences from the facts are to be made in favor of the non-moving party. Taylor v. McNichols,
149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642, 649 (2010); Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm’n, 141 Idaho 129,
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133, 106 P.3d 455, 459 (2005). Ultimately, the court must determine whether a claim for relief
has been stated, not whether the non-moving party will ultimately prevail on its claims. Young v.
City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). The motion will only be
reviewed under Rule 56 when matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court and, in
turn, examined by the court. I.R.C.P. 12(d). When that happens, all parties are to be given an
opportunity to present all pertinent material. Id.; Paslay v. A&B Irrigation Dist., 162 Idaho 866,
869, 406 P.3d 878, 881 (2017); Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep’t of Admin., 159 Idaho 813,
823, 367 P.3d 208, 218 (2016). Appellants were not provided with that opportunity in the
proceedings below, and that the district court further erred in dismissing the Appellants’ claims
on an incomplete record and incorrect precedent.
A. The District Court’s Dismissal of Appellants’ Claims Should be Overturned.
The district court’s decision dismissing the Appellants’ claims (R., p. 934-65) should be
overturned. Appellants contend that the district court’s conclusions on the statute of limitations
issue and the standing issue were incorrect. The district court failed to provide the Appellants
with the necessary notice required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(d), and further
impermissibly ruled on the State’s Motion to Dismiss by not viewing the pleadings and related
inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Appellants. Besides reviewing the motion to
dismiss under the incorrect legal standards, the district court failed to consider the pertinent dates
for its decision related to the statute of limitations issue and did not give proper weight to the
Parry promise, which waived the issue, or the ongoing efforts by the State to resolve the
underlying access issues, and also failed to consider the overview of circumstances related to the
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standing issue and the narrow context and resulting limited reach of the standing decisions
adverse to the Appellants. Accordingly, the Appellants have appealed to this Court seeking a
remand back to the district court to have the issues decided on their merits.
1. The District Court’s Failure to Notify the Appellants of its Review of the Motion
to Dismiss Under a Rule 56 Standard is Not Harmless Error.
In response to the Appellants’ arguments related to the Motion to Dismiss, the State
implicitly concedes that it was error to rule on the motion under a Rule 56 standard, but insists
that it was merely harmless. The State further argues that a review of the combined hearing for
the pending motions provides an alternative justification for this impermissible conversion,
asserting that Appellants’ counsel’s references to previous procedural events in the case, along
with its briefing of the narrower waiver issue in previous motions, waived any entitlement to
Appellants’ due process rights under the Rules. Nevertheless, the Appellants’ dismissal from
this case, without a full and fair opportunity to present a complete record pertinent to the district
court’s basis for its ultimate decision, should not be upheld.1
The district court’s October 11, 2017 decision announced that the State’s Motion to
Dismiss would be analyzed under Rule 56. (R., p. 944.) This choice was not previously
communicated to the parties, and ultimately, the Appellants did not get an opportunity to present
any evidence (or an opportunity to conduct discovery related to the district court’s concerns first
identified in that decision) to refute any factual issue considered to be applicable to the district
court’s conclusions. Typically, the Rules of Civil Procedure protect a party’s right to present all
As discussed in the Appellants’ Opening Brief, the Appellants explained that the record did not have sufficient
evidence to support the district court’s reference to, and reliance on, the Groves transaction and the incomplete
timeline to support its conclusions.
1
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applicable materials in support of its claims or defenses. See Syringa, 159 Idaho at 823, 367
P.3d at 218 (stating parties given opportunity to present all applicable materials when a motion to
dismiss is reviewed under Rule 56). Yet, in this case, the State believes the district court’s
failure to do so below was harmless.
Harmless error is one that does not affect the substantial rights of a party. I.R.C.P. 61. A
failure to comply with notice requirements violate a party’s substantial rights, as a right to notice
and an opportunity to be heard is a universally-recognized fundamental right. Thus, a party must
have notice when the court will look outside the pleadings in such a motion. Syringa, 159 Idaho
at 824, 367 P.3d at 219. Appellants were not provided that notice.
Beyond suggesting the district court’s error was harmless, the State further argues that it
was acceptable for the district court to consider items outside of the pleadings for its
determination on the motion because the hearing transcript can be interpreted as suggesting that
the Appellants may have presented outside materials themselves. A review of the transcript for
the hearing does not provide the justification necessary to convert the review of the motion to the
Rule 56 standards. The referenced hearing of August 14, 2017, did not address only the motion
to dismiss. (Tr., pp. 80-140.). “THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody. . . . “We’re here on
– basically, -- I guess, we’re here on kind of everything . . . .” (Id. p. 80, LL. 21-24.) The
hearing also addressed the pending motions for partial summary judgment. (Tr., p. 91, LL. 1221.) Though the State presented argument first, it did not go into the motion to dismiss at first.
(Tr., p. 82, L. 25-p. 83, L. 1 (“So I think I want to make a point before we – before I launch into
the Motion to Dismiss.”).) The State made arguments about the record for about three pages
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worth of Transcript before getting to its Rule 12 arguments. (See Tr., p. 86, LL. 5-6 (“So if, in
fact – and I’m getting to the Motion to Dismiss right now.”).) Like the State, Appellants’
counsel also addressed other matters before going into the argument for the Motion to Dismiss.
(See Tr., p. 103, LL. 19-23 (“I want to turn now if I could, but I thought that background was
important. I want to turn to the Motion to Dismiss, and there are two big pieces of it and let me
start, as I think Mr. Kronberg did, with the Steve Parry memo.”).)

Every citation to the

Transcript that the State references as support for its argument actually comes before the
Appellants’ counsel turns to his motion to dismiss argument. The State references pages 92, 9699, and 101-102 of the Transcript, which all come before the start of Appellants’ argument
opposing the motion to dismiss on page 103. Appellants do not deny that matters outside of the
pleadings were referenced at the August 14, 2017 hearing; however, the Transcript shows clearly
that there were many more issues addressed besides the motion to dismiss.
At the August 14, 2017 hearing, the district court heard arguments on: (1) Defendant’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: (a) Plaintiffs do not have a breach of contract or implied
covenant claim; (b) claims arose in 1997; (c) only owners of the Day Property at the time of any
alleged inverse condemnation claim have standing; and (d) contract damages limited to property
identified in 1967 ROW Contract and warranty deed2 (filed April 28, 2017), (2) Plaintiffs’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver of Statute of Limitation Defense3
(filed May 17, 2017), (3) Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate (filed June 22, 2017), (4) Plaintiffs’
That part of the Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Plaintiffs have mitigated their damages
was previously decided by the district court.
3
The Appellants’ Motion on waiver of the Statue of Limitations was much narrower than the State’s Motion to
Dismiss.
2
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Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award (filed
July 7, 2017), (5) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and
Insurable Title (filed July 11, 2017), (6) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss re: Statute of
Limitations (filed July 15, 2017), (7) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Affidavits of Nick Schug and
Ken Franklin (filed August 7, 2017), and (8) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Affidavits of Glen
Lorensen, Donna Day Jacobs and Counsel Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title (filed
August 8, 2017) (R. p. 934.). Therefore, the State’s argument that the Appellants introduced
matters outside the pleadings on the State’s Motion to Dismiss should fail.
Finally, the State attempts to argue that the procedural history cited by the Appellants in
their opposition to the State’s motion was akin to presenting matters outside the pleadings.
Properly framing the State’s motion in light of the many other issues brought before the court at
the time should not be considered as an attempt by the Appellants to convert the motion to one
determined pursuant to Rule 56. If the Appellants wished to do that, they would have cited to
those materials as appropriately considered under Rule 56 to oppose the entry of summary
judgment, like affidavits and discovery. In opposition to the State’ motion, the Appellants only
cited to the allegations in the Complaint. (R., pp. 814-31.) Thus, contrary to the State’s
contention, even though “plainly” not related to the pleadings (Resp.’s Opening Brief, p. 31) the
Appellants’ references to extra-complaint materials related to other pending motions (Resp.’s
Opening Brief, p. 31), the record does not support the argument that the Appellants have waived
any right to notice when the motion was converted by the district court. Accordingly, the
Appellants were not given a fair opportunity to present evidence designed to refute any
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inferences from the incomplete record considered by the district court in the State’s motion to
dismiss.4
2. The Circumstances in This Matter Do Not Support a Ruling That the
Appellants’ Claims are Barred by Applicable Statutes of Limitation.
Throughout its arguments, the State downplays the full extent of the actions the State has
taken to resolve the once promised frontage road. Up until the ACHD’s denial on May 16, 2016,
the State worked with and for the Appellants to provide suitable access. After that point, the
State has insisted that it had no obligation to the Appellants. The Appellants were justified in
working with the State and avoiding a lawsuit while there was uncertainty as to the extent of the
access problems caused by the State and a potential solution, and this is especially so considering
that in the midst of the process the State expressly promised that it would waive any statute of
limitations defense until it was certain there was no chance for resolution. Unfortunately, on
May 16, 2016, that certainty was achieved and thereafter the State was unwilling to continue to
work on providing access to the Property. A further infortune was that thereafter the State also
decided that the Parry Promise was not binding and raised a statute of limitations defense in the
lawsuit filed five and one-half months later. The State’s actions should not prevent Appellants
from pursuing their claims.
The record is clear that there were continued efforts by the State buttressing Appellants’
expectation that the State would fulfill its 1967 promises, or at the very least continue to

Even if the district court’s conversion of the State’s Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment, and no
additional evidence in favor of the Appellants were considered, not only should the State’s Motion fail given the
liberal construction in favor of the non-moving party, but this Court is at liberty to rule in Appellants’ favor.
(Appellants’ Opening Brief. pp. 15-16.)
4
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negotiate paying just compensation for its 1996-97 actions.

The Appellants’ justifiable

expectations of the State, and the State’s ability to perform were all brought to an end on
May 16, 2016, as the ACHD’s decision then manifested that any continued efforts would be in
vain. Accordingly, it was error for the district court to ignore those circumstances and base its
decision on only the record relating narrowly to three allegations in the Complaint without
examining, at the very least, all allegations made by the Appellants. Since it was not apparent
that the claims did not fully arise until May 16, 2016, it was error to conclude that the
November 1, 2016 Complaint was untimely. Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603
P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (“The actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact
determination, is to be fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and
kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs’ property interest, became
apparent.”)
However, the district court found that the December 5, 1997 stipulated valuation date was
the date the Appellants’ claims had accrued and dismissed the Appellants’ claims with prejudice.
(R., p. 935.) In support of the dismissal, the district court only relied on three allegations from
the Complaint and avoided the record before it on the various summary judgment motions
supporting the allegations. (R., p. 954-55.) Even if the May 16, 2016 date is not found to be the
date of accrual, the December 5, 1997 date should not be determinative because the actions of
the State, including the Parry Promise/waiver, acted to extend or toll that date for statute of
limitations purposes.
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a. The actions and words of the State presented a reasonable belief that the
access would be resolved without suit.
Equitable principles intervene, in the proper case, to prevent a defendant from being able
to rely on a time-barred defense. Two such principles advanced by the Appellants, should the
1997 date be determined to be the date of accrual, are that the project completion rule should not
govern because of the justifiable uncertainty of actions out of their control, and also that those
actions, as well as the waiver, prevented the Appellants from having to file a suit during the
ongoing work to obtain access. The State has argued that neither of these arguments should be
recognized by Idaho courts. Appellants contend that suitable precedent exists to support its
arguments.
First, the Appellants contend, while acknowledging that the specific doctrine identified as
justifiable uncertainty does not apply directly to the circumstances in this matter, the equitable
principles underlying that doctrine should be applied to the circumstances in this case. The main
factors in the doctrine itself that are present here are the uncertainty as to the extent and
permanence of a taking, and that this uncertainty is due to direct actions of the government.
Normally, as previously acknowledged by the Appellants, an uncertainty or interference is
caused by a gradual and continuing process of natural occurrences. While the line of cases the
Appellants rely on, e.g., Applegate v. United States, 25 F.3d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and
Banks v. United States, 314 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003), included natural occurrences that the
government promised to mitigate, Appellants believe that Higginson v. Wadsworth, 128 Idaho
439, 915 P.2d 1 (1996), can be read broadly enough to apply the justifiable uncertainty doctrine
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to cases where the State promises to mitigate destructive occurrences that were actually caused
by it, instead of those caused by a combination of natural occurrences and government action.
In Higginson, the Court analyzed takings caused by gradual conduct and the effect on a
date of accrual for statute of limitations purposes, analyzing previous erosion cases. Ultimately,
the Court focused on the subsequent actions of the intervening agencies as justification that
remedies must remain available. Id. at 443, 915 P.2d at 5. The State argues that Higginson has
no application here because it wishes to view the Interchange construction as a single event
limiting recovery like the single excavation in Higginson, but here it was the State’s failure to
continue in its quest to acquire access that was temporarily interrupted by the Interchange’s
construction. Indeed, the State’s quest continued after the construction, and it is that continual
series of actions taken by the State which failed to replace the access interrupted by the
Interchange which should be found to toll the time Appellants had to file their claims.
Of course, the State does not want to acknowledge that it worked hand-in-hand with the
Appellants for years, as well as for them, with the title company and the ACHD, only to abandon
them when the obstacles became insurmountable, nor did the district court want to recognize that
the Complaint referenced or included sufficient materials highlighting this history of continual
collaboration. As the following table illustrates, the State continued its efforts throughout the
years following the construction of the Interchange.

ACTION/ACTIVITY:
Agreement
Stout Appraisal
Onweiler Appraisal

DATE:
November, 17, 1961
June 9, 1967
July 19, 1967

10

Right-of-Way Contract
Warranty Deed to State
Discuss prior obligations with ITD during Interchange construction
ITD obtains Easements for constructing “Stock Drive and Future Public
Road by the state of Idaho” over unsuitable terrain
Isaacs Canyon Interchange completed (without alternative access)
State obtains additional 10 feet to width of Aldecoa easement
New Right-of-Way Easement over BLM proposed by ITD
ACHD staff approval
State negotiates with BLM and third parties to obtain part of new route,
agreeing to cover any realignment costs
State Memo “there remain problems with proposed access from
Eisenman Road…”
Steve Parry Promise
ITD attempts to engineer road to through easements
ACHD letter: “difficult to state…if the proposed road would meet
Highway District standards.”
ITD Deeded Eisenman Road to ACHD
Developer Chris Findlay meets with County and State
Day meeting with Steve Parry re: access
Day Family Joint Venture with Providence Development access
discussed with Boise City, ACHD and State
Dave Leader proposal to buy Day Property
Day meeting with Larry Sale at ACHD
Eisenman Road Finished
Discuss Lake Hazel Road connection to Eisenman Road with ACHD
Catalyst Development LOI to purchase Day Property
Edmonds/Groves Land Holdings purchases Day Property
Lake Hazel connection moved to Boise City property
Real Estate market crash
State orders surveys of Easements to Day Property
Days informed substitute Easements do not connect to Eisenman and
ITD deeded Eisenman Road to ACHD
Day Family re-acquired Day Property from Edmonds/Groves
Title Insurance issues discovered by Glen Lorensen, Pioneer Title Co.
Days meet with Steve Parry to discuss resolution
S .Parry to J. Smith (ITD) “what needs to be done to straighten this out”
Emails with Steve Parry
Steve Parry to Karl Vogt (ITD) “this was 98% complete”
Karl Vogt to Steve Parry “this was out of sight, out of mind”

11

October 23, 1967
October 23, 1967
1996
May-June, 1996
1997
January 6, 1999
February 10, 2000
April 11, 2000
April-June 2000
June 7, 2000
July 19, 2000
September, 6, 2000
February 21, 2001
September, 2001
2001
January 22, 2002
2002-2003
June, 2003
September 16, 2003
2003-2004
2004
November, 2005
December, 2005
2006
2007
May, 2008
August, 2008
December, 2008
December, 2008
January 20, 2009
November, 2009
2009-2010
October 16, 2010
October 18, 2010

Tim Thomas (ITD) to Steve Parry “been on my to do list”
Baker & Leader won’t sign ITD’s “Acknowledgment of Public Road”
Application for Temporary Approach–West Eisenman Road to ACHD
ITD offer Days $560,000 to build road themselves
G.Inselman declares “ACHD will not accept” requested public street

January 10, 2011
2011
February 6, 2014
August, 2015
May 16, 2016

(See e.g., R., pp. 11-116, 254-55, 303-61, 428-30, 457-89.) These actions show that the State
continued to work to overcome the circumstances it brought about by not initially protecting the
Appellants’ access rights during and after the Interchange construction.
The State wants to argue that such actions acknowledging the situation it caused and
attempted to clean up can never toll the statute of limitations. However, precedent exists to
support not applying the statute of limitation where the other party continues to take actions in
furtherance of fulfilling its obligations.

In Barton Press, Inc. v. American Environmental

International, Inc., the defendant was estopped from raising the limitations defense because the
New Jersey District Court found that its attempts to cure may have appeared to the plaintiff as an
ongoing attempt to perform.

No. 94-79, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1450, at *11 (D.N.J.

Jan. 31, 1995). The defendant had initially guaranteed that the equipment it had sold would pass
all New Jersey emissions tests. Id. at *2. When the equipment did not comply with state
regulations, the defendant requested the opportunity to re-test the equipment.

Id. at *3.

Additional failures and requests to re-test ensued, and eventually the defendant promised to make
modifications to improve the equipment, but those modifications proved ineffective and the
system failed a fifth and sixth test. Id. at *3-4. Finally, plaintiff demanded the equipment be
removed and a refund be paid under the initial contract. When defendant refused, a lawsuit was
filed. Id. at *5. The defendant raised a statute of limitations defense, but the court ruled that it
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was barred from raising the affirmative defense. Since the defendant continued to request
additional tests with the assurance that the equipment would finally pass required a lengthy
period reaching beyond the limitation period, the court found that its actions “would have
induced a reasonable person to delay filing suit” and estopped it from claiming that plaintiff
should have filed suit earlier. Id. at *8-10. “Where there is conduct before the expiration of a
limitations period that would induce delay in bringing suit, post-expiration conduct may be
considered as evidence of an estoppel.” Id. at *10. Finally, the court found that the “context of
the parties’ relationship lends further support for the conclusion that defendant is estopped from
raising the limitations defense” because the plaintiff had bargained for the guarantee in the
contract, and the defendants’ attempts to cure were not viewed as “mere settlement
negotiations.” Id. at *10-11. The court reasoned that the defendants was plaintiff’s best hope to
get its equipment to work and that it was reasonable for plaintiff to rely on defendant making its
best effort to cure the problem. Id. at *11.
Similarly, the Colorado District Court found that a defendant’s “repeated reassurances
and efforts to remedy” a precipitator’s poor performance tolled the running of the limitations
period. Colo.-Ute Elec. Assoc. v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Colo. 1981). It
additionally found that even if the repair work had not tolled the statute of limitations, the court
would have found that “continual verbal and written assurances were reinforced by repeated
studies and efforts to correct the problems” and estopped the defendant from claiming such a
defense.

Id.

These efforts included several investigations to learn what was causing the

problems, retained independent contractors to study the problem, and insistence during the
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following years that it was still persisting in its efforts to remedy the problems. “It would be
unconscionable to allow [defendant] to escape its contractual obligations by relying upon a
defense made possible by those reassurances.” Id.; see also Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Celotex
Corp., 264 Ark. 757, 767, 574 S.W.2d 669, 674 (1978) (remanding on question of fact whether
seven (7) years of joint efforts to repair a roof tolled the statute of limitations).
The actions taken by the State in this action should be similarly found to either extend the
statute of limitations period or estop the State from claiming that affirmative defense. The State
had already conceded that it had an obligation to the Appellants and sought additional time to
clear up the access problems it had caused. (See R., pp. 86-87, 88-89.) By requesting additional
time to acquire access for a road to the Property, it was reasonable for the Appellants to delay in
bringing suit when they had initially bargained for the road in their original negotiations with the
State and the State continued to work towards acquiring that road, working as late as 2014 with
ACHD when it initially sought to acquire the necessary approach, and in 2015, offering the
Appellants a cash payment to build a road themselves.

The State’s actions towards the

Appellants and in furtherance of fulfilling its obligations prevent it from raising a statute of
limitations defense.
The other applicable equitable principle is related to the promise given to the Appellants
that the State would not pursue a statute of limitations of defense. However, the district court
failed to appreciate the full effect of the Parry Promise in the State’s July 19, 2000 letter, which
included explicit confirmation that the State would not “assert any type of statute of limitations
defense if an agreement on new access cannot be reached,” yet only extended the applicable
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limitations period by one statutory term. (R., pp. 88-89.) The State concedes that the promise
waived the statute of limitations period, but argues that the waiver was limited to that extent,
making the November 1, 2016 Complaint untimely.5
In the July 19, 2000 letter that included the Parry Promise, the State requested additional
time to provide the Appellants with a resolution to the access issue, acknowledging its obligation
that was entered into by the State in 1967. (R., pp. 88-89.) The State’s agent, Mr. Parry,
concluded the letter by promising that the State would not assert a statute of limitations defense
“if an agreement on new access cannot be reached.” (Id.) Obviously, the subsequent proposals
and actions did not produce a resolution, but the Appellants relied on Parry’s Promise and
continued to work with the State. (See R., pp. 256-57 (“We . . . agreed to not file a lawsuit while
the State continued to work on fixing the public road access issue. I relied on the State’s efforts
because the State repeatedly said that it had an obligation to restore the Property’s direct/frontage
access to the public roads . . . the State had tried to fulfill that obligation, the State admitted that
its first and second attempts to fulfill the obligation had not been sufficient, and the State stated
that it was still working on the issue.”).) In dismissing the Appellants’ claims on the statute of
limitations issue, the district court adopted the State’s argument that Parry’s Promise was
somehow the equivalent of a mere acknowledgement of a debt or obligation, and as such simply
restarted the statute of limitation for one additional period.
However, this promise was something far different from a payment on, promise, or
Contextually, given that this case arises out of the Warranty Deed and ROW Contract executed in 1967, thirty (30)
years prior to the completion of the Isaacs Canyon Interchange in 1997, which took away all access and took away
public road access, the permanency of which was not understood until 2016, recognizing Parry’s Promise in 2000 as
having validity until 2016 – 16 years, is not an unreasonable period.
5
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acknowledgement of an obligation of the type that is recognized in Idaho Code Section 5-238 to
extend a limitations period by an additional statutory term.

This rule of law imposes a

reasonable result on a debtor/creditor relationship. Mr. Parry’s statement was entirely unlike a
partial payment or a mere written “acknowledgement,” which requires some interpretation and is
capable of variable meanings. Thus, Mr. Parry’s statement is not constrained by I.C. § 5-238 and
the rule this Court fashioned to extend the statute of limitations by one limitation period. The
promise is an explicit waiver of the statute of limitation defense until the occurrence of a future
event, or more precisely, when it became apparent that a future event would not occur, in this
case—“when an agreement on new access cannot be reached.” (R., p. 89.)
The State concedes that the contingency affects the ultimate decision but argues that it is
not reasonable to allow an open-ended contingency to control the decision. The State argues for
the contingent waiver to be limited to a reasonable time frame, ignoring of course all the actions
that it continued to take to avoid the contingency should factor into such a reasonable length.
Appellants agree and have continued to advance the proposition that it was not unreasonable on
their part to file suit immediately following the time that the contingency occurred in this matter,
especially when the State had explicitly promised to keep working with them until no new access
could be acquired, and as an added incentive to avoid a lawsuit, promised to not pursue a statute
of limitations defense. During that time, it continued to attempt to acquire suitable access
(July 19, 2000 to May 16, 2016); it could have rescinded its promise, but never did. Indeed, it
could have also announced that it was not able, nor willing, to obtain the access so long ago
promised and worked on—until a few months before after this lawsuit was filed.
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Instead, the State plainly and regularly acted in a manner that signaled to the Appellants
that it was attempting to fix the access issues and trying to obtain the needed approach from
ACHD. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to expect that the promised waiver of the statute of
limitations defense would extend throughout that same period. In essence, the State is arguing
that it was acceptable for them to continue to work with the Appellants to uphold its obligations
to acquire access, but it was not acceptable to expect that its promise to not pursue a statute of
limitations defense while it attempted to reach a new access agreement could be relied upon for
that same time period. Accordingly, the State should be estopped from arguing that a reasonable
length of a waiver does not extend for so long as it continued to work toward a goal for which it
sought to buy time to avoid a lawsuit. Martin v. Levinson, 409 N.E. 2d 1239, 1242 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980) (“It is apparent that a party may, by express agreement or through its conduct, place
himself in a position where he cannot later assert the expiration of a statute of limitation as a
defense.”).
The reasonableness of extending the waiver throughout the time the same circumstances
continue to occur for which the waiver was initially offered is supported by the Atlas case cited
in the Appellants’ opening brief. 68 Cal. App. 2d 504, 157 P.2d 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945).
Regardless of the State’s contention that it only stands for limited propositions in this matter, it
included circumstances that extended beyond the time the initial offer of the waiver was
presented. In Atlas, the waiver continued to be valid throughout the entire time that the plaintiff
continued to pay the government’s storage fees for the seized equipment at issue in the matter.
Id. at 515, 157 P.2d at 407. The State has argued here that this case does not apply because the
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suit was pursued within one statutory period of when its claim first accrued. However, the case
specifically stated that the government knew that the waiver may postpone a suit beyond that
statutory period.
According to the averments contained in the second amended complaint, the
attorney general agreed that, as long as plaintiff paid the storage charges on the
equipment, plaintiff could bring a suit “at its own convenience and whenever it so
desired.” When this agreement was made the attorney general knew of its terms
and was also aware that contained therein were provisions which might postpone
beyond the statutory period the time when plaintiff would commence an action to
determine the legality of its possession of the equipment. From the allegations of
the second amended complaint, it is apparent that there was in the minds of both
parties a question as to the possession of the equipment by plaintiff under the
circumstances pleaded being lawful. Plaintiff wanted additional time to await a
decision by the courts in pending litigation of a character similar to that
contemplated by it. The attorney general was privileged at any time to advise the
plaintiff that he would no longer abide by the agreement, rescind the same, and
demand that plaintiff institute legal proceedings to determine the legality of its
possession of the equipment, but instead of taking such course the attorney
general chose to abide by the agreement and to demand of and to receive from
plaintiff storage charges upon the equipment up to January 1, 1943. As we read
the allegations of the second amended complaint, a fair construction of the
provisions of the agreement that plaintiff “could bring a suit at its own
convenience and whenever it so desired” would be that the same is tantamount to
a waiver of the statute of limitations. In other words, the practical effect of the
agreement between the parties herein was that the attorney general said to the
plaintiff: “In view of pending litigation, upon the outcome of which the legality of
your possession of the equipment in question may be determined, if you will
deliver the equipment to me, I will store the same in a warehouse if you pay the
storage charges thereon, and so long as you do so, and pending the outcome of the
aforesaid litigation, you may bring legal action to determine your rights to
possession of the equipment ‘at your own convenience and whenever you so
desire’.” Therefore, under the provisions of the agreement pleaded herein, it must
be held that the statute of limitations commenced to run only when the parties to
the aforesaid agreement, or one of them, ceased to act upon it, which was well
within three years prior to the commencement of the instant proceeding.
Id. at 515-16, 157 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added).
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Here, similar to Atlas, the potential open-ended nature of the promise does not diminish
its enforceability. Like the attorney general in Atlas, the State is bound by its deputy attorney
general’s promise to not present a statute of limitations defense. In Atlas, that waiver extended
throughout the time that the parties awaited a time where there would be sufficient legal
precedent to inform them on the current dispute, as long as the plaintiff continued to pay the
storage costs. Here, the waiver must extend throughout that time the State continued to work
with the Appellants to seek a “solution to this access issue.” (See R., pp. 88-89.) As in Atlas, the
statute of limitations commenced to run only when the State could no longer act upon that
previous agreement to find a solution to the access issue. Here, like the attorney general’s
opportunities in Atlas, the State had every opportunity to advise the Appellants that the State
would “no longer abide by the agreement, rescind the same, and demand that [Appellants]
institute legal proceedings to determine the legality” of the underlying issue. In fact, as indicated
above, the State’s actions throughout the years illustrate an understanding that they could not
rely on a statute of limitations defense to a suit related to the road.

Even as late as

February 2014, when it applied to the ACHD for an approach, the State was still acting as if it
had an obligation to provide the promised access. (R., pp. 99-114.) Accordingly, the Court
should overturn the district court’s decision limiting the temporal extent of the waiver.
B. The District Court Did Not Consider the Natural and Necessary Succession of
Appellants’ Property Interests.
The Appellants have also asked this Court to overturn the district court’s decision as it
concerns the property interests of the Appellants and their standing to pursue this lawsuit.
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Ultimately, what the Appellants are asking is that this Court look at more than just a snapshot of
vesting at the time of the taking since that does not properly take into account the succession of
ownership. The natural succession of ownership of all property interests over time necessarily
involves transfers of interest and passage of title. If Don and Bob own Blackacre in 1960 when a
taking occurred and Bob dies in 1961 and a suit for inverse condemnation is filed in 1963 by
Don and Bob’s son, Bob Jr., to whom Bob left his interest in Blackacre in his will, under the
State’s view, as adopted by the district court, Bob Jr. is without a remedy because he did not own
the property “at the time of the taking.” (R., p. 948)
1. The Appellants Hold all Applicable Property Interests for Purposes of
Determining Standing.
The present inverse condemnation case and its standing issue does not include the typical
dispute that might follow the seller/buyer issues between competing landowners, as the
respective property rights to the Property have not been transferred through the typical purchase
agreements. The Property has been transferred through the generations of the Day family.
Regardless of the date of the taking, the fact is that the interests were (are) all held by the
members of the Day family. (See R., pp. 395-97, 583-98.) While there is no disagreement that
Donna Day Jacobs and David R. Day hold part of the relevant interests, the State, and now the
district court, have failed to ask where the remaining relevant interests lay. Just because the
present vesting does not parallel word-for-word, or name-for-name, with the vesting during all
relevant time periods, does not mean that the inconsistent names have no relevant property
interests. The remaining property interests did not just evaporate. All interest held by the Day
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family in the Property through the years is still held by the Day family, the Appellants.
As the record shows, all Property was transferred down through the years between the
families of the three Day brothers, Donald M., Ernest E., and Robert pursuant to the brothers’
direct intent to keep the Property in the family’s name for further development. (See R., pp. 59698.) The district court’s final determination as to standing only recognizes 2/9ths of the relative
Property interests. That conclusion did not make any determinations as to the remaining 7/9ths
and the practical implications related to those interests. Does the State’s position and the district
court’s decision mean that these interests evaporated, escheat to the State, or something else?
Regardless of whether the relevant property interests were included in the various deeds between
family members, the fact is that the Property rights held either personally, in a trust, or family
partnership, would ultimately pass per the Day brothers’ intent to their respective family’s heirs.
Thus, if it were determined that during the relevant time period, Ernest had owned an interest in
the Property, and thereby having standing in the current lawsuit, Ernest, deceased, could not
actually hold standing, but his estate would have standing to pursue those property rights he held
at that time. (See id.; see also, id., p. 419.) Of course, his estate would, by operation of law, be
handled by his heirs as he intended.
Thus, regardless of whether the property interests are charted through the Day brothers’
estate planning or a chain of title/abstract, the relevant interest holders are all either named
individually in this lawsuit or are the Day Family individuals holding interest as members (i.e.
Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC), or trust beneficiaries in the named parties. However, despite the
extensive evidence provided by the Appellants, and lack of any contrary evidence, the district
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court determined that only two individuals of the Day family could have standing in the inverse
condemnation claims in this matter.
2. The Obligations Related to the Warranty Deed Grant Standing for the
Appellants to Pursue the Contract Claims.
The Appellants’ current ownership of the Property also grants them standing to pursue
contract remedies related to the promised Future Frontage Road. Appellants seek damages
related to the State’s failure provide the promised road as required by the explicit encumbrance
embedded in the conveyance. Essentially, the State agreed to an affirmative covenant. Upon the
recent failure to obtain the necessary approach from ACHD, the State could no longer reach its
goal of providing the promised road to access the Property. Thus, the Appellants have the right
to recover under the covenant running with the land embodied in the recorded Warranty Deed.
The Appellants first presented this argument before the district court in its briefing
supporting the Partial Summary Judgment filed May 17, 2017 (see R., p. 538-39), but the district
court only considered rights and obligations under the ROW Contract. Interestingly, the State
had already acknowledged the presence of an affirmative covenant in the Warranty Deed, but
now argues that the obligation does not run with the Property. (See R., pp. 86-87 (recognizing
cause of action based on “ITD’s breach of its covenant in the original deed.”) It was error for the
district court to not recognize the obligation of the State to provide the promised road.
The affirmative covenant contained in the Warranty Deed shows that the State agreed to
act sometime in the future to provide the access by a road to the “remaining contiguous property
belonging to Grantor.” (R., pp. 44-45.) Multiple cases recognize that such an affirmative
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covenant can be part of the compensation in a condemnation agreement and a failure to meet
those obligations entitles the condemnee to further compensation. In State Highway Commission
v. Grenko, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the State Highway Commission had
promised, and thought that it had obtained, as part of condemnation of an 18-acre tract of land to
provide access to the northerly part of the parcel that was divided for construction of the
Interstate. 80 N.M. 691, 692, 460 P.2d 56, 57 (1969). The issue on appeal was the amount of
compensation at the time of the condemnation since the State had actually failed, as shown by
the maps introduced at trial, to obtain the necessary access to the northerly parcel. During trial,
the State had finally obtained the access from the BLM and sought to reduce the amount of
compensation owed. Id. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the updated
access would be considered for purposes of compensation, but also enforced the State’s
obligation to ultimately provide the access physically. 80 N.M. at 694-95, 460 P.2d at 59-60
(“Moreover, the Grenkos are amply protected; if the State deviates from its construction plans in
a manner to cause further loss to the landowners, i.e., fails to provide the access, another taking
or damaging results for which just compensation must again be assessed.”) Thus, the case was
remanded to find whether the landowner had been damaged in the interim for loss of the access
to the northerly parcel. Id. at 695, 460 P.2d at 60.
Similarly, in Huston v. Cincinnati & Zanesville Railroad Co. , the Ohio Supreme Court
found that a condemnation agreement had been limited by a covenant running with the land. 21
Ohio St. 235, 246 (1871). There, a railroad company agreed to construct crossings, and by
failing to ultimately construct them, a right of action had accrued in favor of the condemnee. Id.
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at 247. “It was in the nature of a charge upon that land, subjecting it to a servitude in favor of the
estate from which it was to be taken.”) Similar to Grenko and Huston, the State here is obligated
to fulfil the covenant contained in the Warranty Deed. By failing to fulfil the obligation, the
Appellants have a right of action based on the covenant.
The State also urges that Hughes Farms, Inc. v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission
Assoc., Inc., has no application in this matter, suggesting it only applies for the proposition of a
condemnor agreeing to pay future crop damages.

However, it specifically shows that a

condemnor can be later bound by a reservation of future property rights to the condemnee that
was initially used as a means to mitigate the condemnation damages owed by condemnor at the
time of the agreement. 182 Neb. 791, 797, 157 N.W.2d 384, 388 (1968). Essentially, the case
shows the difference in legal effect between a stipulation or declaration subject to a statute of
limitations, and reservations of property rights or covenants running with the land.
It would seem clear that the situation here involves a reservation of property
rights in the landowner, binding stipulations to that effect, and a condemnation
limited to exclude a damaging of future crops. Where the condemner alleges in its
application for a perpetual easement for an electric transmission line its intention
that the landowners retain the use of the land under said line and between said
structures, and the applicant obligates itself to pay all future crop damages
incident to the construction, maintenance, and reconstruction of said line when
and if such damages occur; and such proposal is accepted by the condemnee, and
the case is presented to the jury on that basis and the jury instructed to disregard
all future crop damage, the judgment should contain a provision that the easement
acquired is subject to the obligation of the condemner to pay such future crop
damages when and if such damages occur.
Id. The current case includes the same type of agreement – a mitigation of initial damages in
exchange for the condemnor entering into an affirmative covenant to act in some way in the
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future. The Henderson v. Iowa State Highway Commission case (also thought by the State to be
of no value to this matter) also involves recognition that a future affirmative covenant can be
promised to the condemnee by the condemnor, and can be enforced if valid. 260 Iowa 891, 8967, 151 N.W.2d 473, 476-7 (1967). Here, the Warranty Deed includes an affirmative covenant
that is valid. Therefore, it was error for the district court to not consider the Warranty Deed in its
decision and this matter should be remanded for further proceedings.
C. The State is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees.
The State contends that it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12−120(3) in relation to the Appellants’ contract claims. The State only argues that I.C.
§ 12-120(3) applies to a contractual relationship as is present in the current matter but does not
provide any argument why it is entitled to attorney fees under the section. By stating only that
the provision is “triggered” but failing to explain how they are entitled to an award, they have not
properly requested an award and it should be denied. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805,
241 P.3d 972, 978 (2010). Regardless, the State’s arguments as to the contract claims cannot
stand as explained above, and the State is not entitled to an award of fees under I.C. § 12-120(3)
if it is not the prevailing party.
II.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, the Appellants respectfully request that this Court find
that the district court’s decision was entered in error, overrule it, and remand the matter for
further proceedings below.
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